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War games are currently enjoying a revival of interest
and popularity within the American defense community.
Strategists, analysts, and policy-makers alike are turning
more and more to gaming as a medium for education, planning
and discovery. This thesis investigates the nature, utility,
and limitations of strategic- level war gaming as a tool for
strategic planning and international negotiations. It offers
a perspective on gaming different (yet complementary) to that
of operations research: war games are viewed as sources of
synthetic history, to be studied and interpreted by
historical -type methods.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ---- - 5
II, STRATEGIC GAMING AS A HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY ------- 9
A. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY .
STRATEGIC GAMING - 9
B. GAMING CHARACTERIZED: A "REASONABLE"
METHODOLOGY - , --'--- 14
C. GAMING METHODOLOGY AND A HISTORICAL
PARADIGM -.».- 18
D. LEARNING FROM GAMES -- 26
III. GAMING METHODOLOGY: APPLICATIONS - 32
A. CLASSIFICATION OF GAMES - - --- 32
B. GAMES STRATEGISTS PLAY: SOME SPECIFIC
APPLICATIONS - - 47
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF GAMING ---- --- 57
A. THE INNER LIMITS OF GAMES: PROBLEMS
WITHIN THE BLACK BOX --- - 57
B. THE OUTER LIMITS OF GAMES: PROBLEMS
BEYOND THE BLACK BOX - 60
V. CONCLUSIONS - 70
A. THE WAR GAME: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 70
B. UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF WAR GAMING - 74
APPENDIX: GLOSSARY 81
LIST OF REFERENCES - 84
BIBLIOGRAPHY 89




War games are currently enjoying a revival of interest
and popularity within the American defense community.
Strategists, analysts, and policy-makers alike are turning
more and more to gaming as a medium for education, planning
and discovery. (Hoffman, 1984, p. 820) War games facilitate
multi-dimensional examination of strategic issues without
risk and and at relatively little expense:
Gaming provides a means of gaining useful experience andinformation in advance of an actual commitment, of
experimenting with forces and situations that are too
remote, too costly or too complicated to mobilize and
manipulate, and of exploring and shaping the organizations
and systems of the future. (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-25)
To an era obsessed with "static measures" and "bean counts"
gaming offers a critical yet refreshing opportunity to study
the dynamic qualities of strategic affairs.
This thesis investigates the nature, utility, and
limitations of war gaming as a tool for the American
strategist. The term "game" has a number meanings, several
of which are relevant to defense policy studies. Broadly
speaking, a game is a competition between two or more
decision centers, none having perfect intelligence on the
other (Quade, 1975, p. 199) A more refined definition, and
one of greater significance to the strategist, specifies the
game as a competitive or conflict situation in which
opposing human players influence events with their own
decisions .
*
Two strategically important categories of gaming are the
"war game" and the "strategic game." The war game is simply
a game that simulates political or military conflict without
operating real forces. The strategic, or pol it ical -mi 1 itary
game is a type of war game that examines a full range of
political, military, economic, and social issues with regard
to a nation's overall security policy (Brewer and Shubik,
1979, p. '^''7). Within the context of this thesis, all gaming
is regarded as a human function; every game must contain some
explicit decisionmaking by one or more human players. And
since the concern is solely with strategic issues, the terms
"game," "war game," "strategic game," and "pol it ical -mi litary
game" are used interchangeably.
Gaming is a methodology, related in many respects to the
quantified analytical techniques favored in many contemporary
policy studies. Yet the benefits of gaming stem not simply
from quantification, but more so from its special ability to
approximate the effects of human behavior in a simulated
environment. True games use real people playing out roles.
Players make decisions in the game much as they would in the
real world, and they must live with the consequences of those
•See Appendix for a complete glossary of terms used in
this thesis
.
decisions. The processes of a game resemble those of actual
human history in that causation, motivation, and contingency-
are key elements. Because of this resemblance, games are a
source of artificial experience, whereby players learn from
decisionmaking opportunities, and synthetic history, from
which analysts and strategists may extract useful
information.
Much recent research on strategic war games is the
product of operations research analysts (generally referred
to as "analysts" within this paper) educated in the
quantitative methodologies. This thesis takes a different
and often-neglected approach by examining strategic games
from an orientation of history. Chapter Two introduces
gaming as a historical methodology closely related to, and
reliant upon, analytical processes. Chapter Three describes
the structure of modern war games and offers some salient
examples of strategic gaming application. By assessing some
of the problems and distortions associated with games.
Chapter Four attempts to identify their methodological
limitations. The thesis concludes with Chapter Five: an
appraisal of the pros and cons of war games, and some
suggestions on how the strategic community may best exploit
their potential.
Whereas most analysts think of gaming in terms of
results, rigor, and rationality, the intent here is to look
beyond the "Black Boxes" that typify their orientation. The
perspective of this work is that of the strategist and
historian; the focus: process, practicality and plausibility
II . STRATEGIC GAMING AS A HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY
Strategic gaming, and indeed war gaming in general, is at
heart a historical methodology. This chapter focuses on the
relationship between gaming and history in several ways,
starting with an overview of the historical origins of
contemporary strategic gaming. Next, the historical character
of gaming is elaborated upon by comparing war games to
analytical methodologies. A historical paradigm is then
presented, and the nature and processes of gaming are
evaluated in light of this paradigm. Finally, the different
ways of acquiring knowledge through the gaming methodology
are briefly examined.
A. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC GAMING
Although war games date to ancient times, modern
strategic gaming traces its roots back to the decade or so
following World War II. With the United States only recently
thrust into its role as superpower, strategic thought was in
ferment; much intellectual energy was being expended to meet
the unprecedented challenges of a new atomic age. The awesome
destructive power of nuclear weapons drove strategists to
rethink the fundamental nature of war : whereas in the past
strategy had dictated the employment of armaments, nuclear
weapons now directed the shaping of strategy. To nations
armed with weapons of mass destruction, all conflict came
under the nuclear shadow, and all important decisions in
conflict were influenced by perceptions of the balance of
strategic nuclear forces. The horrible potentials of nuclear
war caused forward-thinking theorists to shift the emphasis
of strategy from fighting wars to preventing them.
Deterrence became the primary goal of military strategy.
Among other approaches , war gaming soon emerged as a
promising methodology for the teaching and study of national
security problems. While traditional war games normally
treated only military matters, the exigencies of deterrence
required examination of non-military solutions as well.
Working at various universities and research organizations,
political scientists like Herbert Goldhamer and Lincoln P.
Bloomfield developed "political gaming" techniques. In
addition to considering military measures, these new methods
introduced political and social factors as instruments of
strategy by eschewing "...schematic simplification of the
international political situation..." and attempting to
"...simulate as faithfully as possible much of its
complexity. The government of each country was to be
represented by a separate player or group of players."
(Goldhamer and Speier, 1959, p. 73)
The pioneer efforts of early political gamers were soon
eclipsed by the analytical approaches of the "McNamara era."
During the 1960s and 1970s, many defense officials came to
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rely heavily on analysis to provide more rational bases for
national strategies (Kaplan, 1983, pp. 248-257). Many war
games of the era were inclined to reflect the same
assumptions and attitudes that characterized these rigorous
methodologies.* Typical was the Strategy and Force Evaluation
Game (played at Rand Corporation in 1961-62), which asserted
that strategic force requirements "...could be calculated
with reasonable precision, defining cost effectiveness as the
combat effectiveness of each system per dollar of outlay .
"
(Brown and Paxson , 1975, p. 35)
Despite the existence of some gaming centers (like the
Joint Chiefs of Staff), gaming methodology was generally not
emphasized as a tool for strategic studies during the 1960s
and 1970s. This was mainly due to its excessive time demands
and supposed imprecision. In their drive to eliminate
uncertainty and ambiguity from the policy formulation
process, influential analysts favored the rigor and speed of
mathematical models and computer simulations (Allen, 1987,
pp. 136-140). But such analytic techniques stressed
measurable parameters and minimized more indeterminate
properties. Consequently, much of the period's strategic
analysis (and policy) was naturally predisposed toward
•Atypical of the period were the pol it ical -mi 1 itary games
begun in 196 2 by the Joint War Games Agency ( JWGA ) of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Chapter 3 for a description of
the present-day activities of JWGA'a descendant, the Force,
Structure, Resource and Assessment Directorate (J-8).
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quantified technical and fiscal subjects; "squishy"
political, social, and psychological factors were usually not
considered (Bracken, 1984, pp. 796-797).
Dissatisfied with the results of policy built by
narrowly-defined quantitative methods, some strategists,
analysts, and policy-makers have revived interest in
broad-based strategic gaming. "There is a growing need to
game the pol it ical -strategi c aspects with the military
aspects," wrote analyst Alfred H. Hausrath in 1971, "treating
both as parts of the same international conflict situation.
The problem is to find a means of considering the pertinent,
subjective, and slowly maturing factors without distorting
the objective data and quick-reacting effects." (Hausrath,
1971, p. 224) A decade later, the Andrew W. Marshall, the
Defense Department's venerable Director of Net Assessment
expressed concern over "...the inadequacies of the standard
strategic exchange models and calculations..." and
challenged the defense community to explore gaming as a
supplement to conventional analytic procedures (Marshall,
1982, p. 47).
Other experts also extol the virtues of gaming. Garry D.
Brewer (a well-known critic of analytic practices) observes:
Most of the real problems confronting decisionmakers are
far less technical than the preponderance of
techno-engineer ing studies would suggest. Even in those
areas where technical matters seem to figure
prominently .. .the crucial role of political and
institutional factors almost invariably matters more. If
those in the defense policy process have learned nothing
12
else in the past twenty to thirty years, it must be that
narrow technical analysis, no matter how elegant or
scientific in appearance, are probably as bad or worse than
no analysis at all. (Brewer, 1984, p. 810)
How can these analytical shortcomings be ameliorated? Brewer
suggests gaming as one solution: "Thought of as a means for
exploration and discovery, manual gaming presents an
opportunity to enrich and balance analysis conducted for
other purposes." (Brewer, 1984, p. 812)
So the current renaissance of gaming as a methodology for
strategic studies is largely stimulated by the need to get at
issues beyond quantification. "Today's multilateral defense
issues are more difficult," remarks one strategist,
existing and potential technologies more complex, and
threats are more sophisticated than ever before ... .Future
military operations will likely encompass increasingly
sophisticated combined arms use of sea, land, air, and
space assets to achieve strategic, operational, and
tactical objectives. The complexity of these operations
will be compounded by the different suggested strategies,
logistical difficulties, competing demands for resource
allocation, varying response times for the different types
of forces, and the rapid tempo of modern warfare. Thus, we
need more sophisticated simulations and better gaming
mechanisms. (Masterson and Tritten, 1987, p. 117)
If games can provide some of the answers analysis cannot,
analytic techniques contribute greatly to the capability
modern gaming. The two methodologies enjoy a mutually
beneficial relationship, and it is worthwhile to examine
gaming in light of this symbiosis.
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B. GAMING CHARACTERIZED: A "REASONABLE" METHODOLOGY
As the fo-.*egoing discussion suggests, gaming is not a
strictly quantitative methodology; it considers many aspects
of reality that are beyond mathematical expression. Gaming
explores qualitative issues, furnishing a plausible,
practical, or "reasonable" approach to strategic studies:
"Important perceptual and procedural matters surface in the
play of manual scenario games; they almost never do in
computer-based analysis." (Brewer, 1984, p. 807) And while
some components -^f games may be analytic, gaming is not
analysis .*
Part of the symbiosis between gaming and analysis results
from their similarities. Both methodologies rely on
scenarios and other contextual elements to provide their
functional foundation and boundaries. In addition, both
approximate reality through mechanical elements; both use
models, rules, procedures, and data bases to approximate
real -world processes. Yet if gaming and analysis do bear
some resemblance to each another , they also exhibit profound
differences. These differences are manifest in their
paradigm, purpose, and operation. (Perla and Branting, 1986,
p. 6 )
*The notion of gaming and analysis as "reasonable" and
"rational" approaches (respectively) is a brainchild of LCDR
Jamyie Durnan, USN (Durnan, 1987).
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1 . Purpose and Paradigm
With its roots in physical science, analysis assists
in policy formulation by applying rational procedures:
The physical sciences are the paradigm of analysis.
Analysts build mathematical models of reality, take
measurements to quantify the parameters of the models, and
manipulate both models and parameters to learn about
reality or to find the "best" solutions to the problems it
poses. (Perla and Branting, 1986, p. 2)
Despite its atbility to scientifically examine many elements
of policy, analysis comes up short on matters outside the
physical paradigm. When confronted with unquantif iable
phenomena, such as most human behavior, analysts must either
exclude them or simplify them beyond recognition. Analysis
cannot effectively reduce the complex and often imprecise
nature of human behavior to a series of algorithms. This is
especially true in situations of human conflict, where
analysis, by itself, "...can provide little insight into why
and how a brilliant hunch, or incredible blunder, a bold
gamble, or paralyzing indecision can destroy carefully
crafted plans or turn ad hoc operations into decisive
victories." (Perla and Barrett, 1985b. p. 78)
But gaming can capture some properties of human
behavior (knowledge, emotion, character, etc.) that may lead
to decisive victories or ignoble defeats. While analysis
focuses on physical phenomena, gaming emphasizes "human"
matters; it attempts to provide a sound, if subjective, basis
for policy by addressing a phenomenon that defies
15
quantification: human decisionmaking.* Games do not simply
address physical parameters and processes with mathematical
models. By placing live humans in decisionmaking roles,
games "model" human parameters and processes. If analysis is
the stepchild of physical science, gaming is more closely
related to history: "Thus to exploit wargaming, the physical
sciences must give way to a new paradigm, that of history."
(Perla and Branting, 1986, p. 3)
2 . Operation
Gaming and analysis also differ in how they operate.
Analytical approaches are best described by adjectives like
deterministic, optimal, replicable, precise, and
model -creating. Key words for gaming methodology are:
realistic, unpredictable, broad, subjective, process -or iented
and model -using.
Analyses are designed to simplify variables and focus
narrowly on specific pieces of reality, and analytic
procedures must be replicable to be useful . They are
performed over and over following rigid, predetermined event
sequences. Using this iterative approach, data may be
progressively manipulated and r^iined in pursuit of an
•Analytical methods also model human decisionmaking,
albeit indirectly. As Dr. Peter P. Perla has observed, the
analytic process is implicitly fraught with human judgment:
Analysis focuses on the physical processes of reality,
adopting a philosophy of approximating those processes with
mathematics that can, in some sense, be "solved." Although
the mathematics may be "objective", the choices of models
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optimized outcome. Thus tangible, substantial results are
produced by analysis, and they are frequently expressed in
the form of a model
.
In contrast, gaming is process -or iented . Replication
may not be as important as realism, so games usually feature
a dynamic, unpredictable course of events that better
approximate real human affairs. As a result, strategic games
permit players and policy-makers to concentrate on broad
issues rather than precisely defined variables. Optimization
is less appropriate in these types of pol it ical -military
games; the best games provide a wide variety of issues and
potential developments for the strategist to ponder.
Gaming and analysis each function well within its own
paradigm. If analysis often fails to provide the policy maker
with practical insight, gaming cannot always address
important matters more suited to quantification. In truth,
the prudent analyst and wise strategist will use both
Reasonable and Rational approaches to develop policy:
Large-scale political and operational decisions modeled,
however imperfectly, in a wargame can sometimes have more
important effects on the conduct and utility of an
operation than the detection range of a sonar or the
probability of accurate weapons placement given detonation.
and parameters, underlying assumptions, and sometimes the
method of solution are all subjective ones. (Perla and
Branting, 1986, p. 2)
Decisions simulated through Analysis are essentially
prefabricated; they are fixed by the analyst even before the
model is run. In gaming, on the other hand, decisionmaking
can be an explicit, ongoing process.
17
Yet , without the understanding of the latter factors
provided by good analysis, the decisions can be too
abstract, too sterile, and their effects assumed rather
than assessed. The gaming and analysis pieces must fit
together. (Perla and Branting, 1986, p. 10)
Models that are outputs from analysis are often
inputs into the gaming process, and any analytical data
generated through political -military games is all the more
reliable for having been subjected to the "reality test" of
human competition. But from the strategist's viewpoint,
analytic models are essentially tools that help determine the
results of player decisions. To him, the most important
learning from games is derived from the experience, study and
interpretation of human decisionmaking and its effects. In
this regard, the strategist's best "model" is history.
C. GAMING METHODOLOGY AND A HISTORICAL PARADIGM
1 . A Historical Paradicrm
The power of gaming as a methodology lies in its
close correspondence to the historical paradigm. One version
of this paradigm portrays human history as a cyclic process
built on three elements: Situation, Nature, and Human
Decisions
.
Even though history is in truth a perpetual flow of
events, it is often necessary for humans to divide it into
comprehensible chunks. Herein lies the concept of Situation,
which is basically an appraisal of the state of affairs, a
view of existing conditions and circumstances frozen in time
18
and space. Situation provides a cognitive reference point
upon which the human mind can act: Human Decisions are made
that change or maintain the Situation.
Nature is the vehicle through which physical
processes (directly) and human decision-making (indirectly)
influence the Situation. Situations determined by Nature,
independent of any human involvement, are within an
exclusively physical paradigm; they are part of natural
history (see Figure 1). Human history superimposes human
behavior upon the physical paradigm. The historical paradigm
supplements purely natural actions with those affected by
Human Decisions (see Figure 2).
Decisions are arrived at when the human mind compares
its perception of the existing Situation with its
expectations of what the Situation should be. If change is
warranted, a decision is made to initiate certain physical
actions that will favorably modify the Situation. If
perceptions meet expectations, a decision may be made to do
nothing (which is an action in itself).
Taken together the three elements of this paradigm
capture the character and flow of human history: humans
appraise situations and make decisions that translate into
physical action, thus creating "new" situations. Historical
knowledge is derived from the study and interpretation of
this never-ending process and its yield. In much the same
19
Flgur0 1: A Physical Paradigm
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Figure 2: A Historical Paradigm
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way, knowledge can be extracted from the synthetic histories
produced by gaming.
2 . The Gaming Methodoloay
Gaming methodology is founded on three structural
components: Scenario, Participants, and Mechanics, which
correspond closely to the three elements of the historical
paradigm (see Figure 3).
Scenario resembles the historical paradigm's
"Situation" in many respects. A game's Scenario is in
essence a summary of some hypothetical situation (a view of
conditions and circumstances frozen in time and space) upon
which play is to be premised. The strategic Scenario usually
includes a full correlation of forces: an accounting of
military, political, economic, and other resources available
to each side. It should also explain to participants what
their intended goals and interests as game actors are, as
well as describe the organizational relationships through
which they exercise command, control, and communications.
As with real -world situations, the game's Scenario
may be altered by decisions. Within a game. Scenario
alteration occurs through the operation of Participant and
Mechanical components, which respectively simulate tne
historical paradigm's Human Decisionmaking and Nature. In
this sense, Scenario is both an input an an output of the
gaming process.
22
Figure 3: The Oamlng Methodology
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Within the historical paradigm, human decisionmaking
is the font of action. In like fashion, game decisionmaking
is performed by human Participants functioning as either
players or umpires. The role of players is straightforward.
Their decisions determine the game "moves"; they initiate
actions to influence course of the game and modify the
original scenario. They are assisted in this capacity by
umpires and controllers on the game Control staff.
Umpires or controllers serve three principle
functions: adjudication, regulation, and communication.
Through adjudication, umpires assess interactions between
players and determine the outcome of player moves (see Figure
4). Regulation is affected by enforcing game rules and
procedures, and by improvising when game events move beyond
the scope of existing rules. Once their adjudication and
regulation decisions are made, controllers must communicate
results to the players, as the general flow of information
within the game is primarily their responsibility.
In accomplishing their duties, umpires operate the
game's Mechanical components: the models that simulate
real-life physical processes. While they may be manual or
machine operated, all models share certain characteristics:
all incorporate the rules and procedures, and most use data
bases of one variety or another. Within a gaming context,
models are tools. They serve to simulate physical processes


















Figure 4: Information Flow In A Typical War Game
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intelligence techniques, they may approximate important (but
not all) aspects of human decisionmaking.
Operating in a cyclic pattern almost identical to the
historical paradigm, gaming methodology requires Participants
to make decisions (Human Decisionmaking) that set in motion
Mechanical components (Nature), which in turn modify the
game's Scenario (Situation). Emerging from this process is a
"...synthetic history composed of imagined events...", which
can often "...disclose features for which the reasons -
ascertained by subsequent examination and reflection -
constitute well grounded understanding and insight."
(Sterne, 1966, p. 64) In circumstances where no historical
accounts exist, such as in the study of future conflict, a
game's synthetic history may be an important knowledge
source. It can supply strategists with a wealth of
information and insights not otherwise available.
D. LEARNING FROM GAMES
The strategist may learn from games in three ways:
through the experience of game play, research of game
history, and involvement in the game development process
(Perla, 1985a, p. 13). By playing in a game, the strategist
can personally experience many facets of strategic
decisionmaking. He may also acquire insights by studying
game -generated history, which is similar to the real thing in
that its lessons are seldom obvious; they are mainly
26
discovered through research and reflection. To fully
understand how its underlying assumptions effect player
decisions, the strategist should be familiar with how the
game was developed. And by learning about the game, he also
learns more about the reality upon which the game is based.
1 . Game Experience
Vicarious decisionmaking in war games may furnish the
strategist with experience otherwise acquired only through
the "heat of action." "Gaming..." a political scientist once
observed, "...offers an opportunity to play out a strategy
over a period of time and to observe concrete consequences of
decisions. Moreover, the importance of theory is easier to
demonstrate when a system is actually in operation."
(Guetzkow and others, 1963, p. 12)
In the game, as in real life, the player learns by
developing and executing plans, and assessing their
effectiveness. He does not learn "how to react to specific
situations,..." but rather to become "...aware of factors
that influence the outcome in conflict situations," such as
command and control, geography, intelligence, and logistics.
(Lawrence, 1986, p. 22) A good war game trains the strategic
mind to exploit enemy weaknesses and friendly strengths, and
to seek advantage from emergent circumstances. Games also
cultivate an appreciation for an opponent's strategic
culture, and they give players a first hand "feel" for the
uncertainties of conflict wrought by the "fog of war."
27
2 . Researching Game History
Research into game history may be conducted with an
eye towards analytic results, or historical interpretation,
or both (Thompson, 1983, p. 85).
Certain war games are conducted to generate numerical
data for analysis, and these types of games generally place
heavy reliance on mathematical models, especially computer
models. The game itself is used to impart strategic reality
to the data; the test of human competition can help establish
the models' credibility. Despite the benefits of using a war
game as an analytic tool, researchers must be wary of placing
too much credence in their findings, as "...it is usually a
mistake to expect wargames to provide detailed quant itiative
support for proving theories." (Perla, 1985a, p. 17) Good
war games are reasonable but imperfect representations of
reality, and the analyst attempting to draw realistic
conclusions from game-based data should do so only with
extreme caution.
Historical study and interpretation is probably a
better means to extract relevant information from most
political -mi litary type games. Since he is mainly interested
in the processes and effects of human decisionmaking in these
games, the strategist can readily apply historical methods to
his investigations. If history is to teach anything about
human behavior (besides "facts")," writes one game historian,
"it must do so through study aimed at discovering why plans
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took the course they did, and why events occurred." (Sterne,
1966, p. 65) Thus the strategist/historian attempts to
establish the causes of game events, and to assess the
motivations behind player decisions. He must also sort out
and evaluate the meaning of contingencies, or chance events,
which occur when "... two or more chains of causation cross
in an unpredictable and apparently chance fashion." (Shafer,
1980, p. 32) Through sound utilization of these and other
principles of historical research, the strategist can derive
meaningful generalizations from game history. These
generalizations may then help formulate hypothesis to be
tested by other means.
3 . The Process of Game Development
The game development process creates and fuses game
components into a realistic, workable system of simulation.
Because the process is a continuous, circular effort, it may
be thought of as a development cycle, or "gaming loop."
(Perla, 1985b, p. 76) The gaming loop is divided into two
phases: Design and Play.
During the Design phase, the game designer fashions
his thoughts and observations into game components. As a
first step, he must establish the game objectives, for they
are the fundamental determinant of game design. To this end,
he should answer the questions: what issues will the game
examine? What are the player roles? What type of decisions
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should be made? What kinds of interactions should occur?
And, how can game design best realize game objectives?
Without loosing sight of his objectives (sometimes a
very challenging task in itself), the designer next develops
his game system. He will more than likely conduct extensive
research on both the situation and processes (both physical
and human) he wishes to portray in the game.» Armed with this
knowledge, he creates the game's context, and devises both
participant roles and game mechanics. The entire process
should include cross-checks th«xt verify the accuracy and
adequacy of any data used in the game's models, as well as
the operation of the models themselves.
Play commences as soon as game development is
complete. In effect, the game is tested each time it is
played, rendering game play an essential part of the overall
game development process. Effective play will raise
questions and issues that challenge the game design and
eventually translate into improvements on that design. For
example, participants may discover that the game's scenario
*One commercial gamer has compared game design to writing
a book
:
Designing a game is very much like writing a book: the
designer - as does the author - gathers a great deal of
information, marshals it, transforms it into a product,
polishes it through many rewrites, and then presents the
finished product for consumption... (Berg, 1983, p. 31)
And like a book, the game is (or should be) subject to
continuous improvement and revision through feedback from
players and researchers.
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is too contrived, or that its models do not provide
reasonable results. During game play, both players and
designers should "ask the right questions": did the players
learn anything new by their game experience? Did they learn
as the game designer/sponsor intended (did the game meet
designer/sponsor objectives)? Does the game provide
reasonable outcomes? Does it handle unforeseen situations
effectively? Does it run smoothly? Answers often lead to
further revisions and improvements in the game, thus creating
a more accurate representation of reality (and a more
effective tool for the strategist). (Perla, 1986, p. 15)
Lest the gaming loop appear to be an end in itself,
perhaps it is best to rename it the "Knowledge Loop" to
better emphasizes the fundamental purpose of gaming
methodology: not simply to produce good games, but to produce
useful knowledge. Involvement in the knowledge loop of a
game compels designers, analysts, participants and
policy-makers alike to examine closely its underlying
assumptions. The knowledge loop thus builds an informed,
balanced perspective, and a healthy skepticism with which to
assess the game's true lessons. Judiciously applied, gaming
methodology can lead to improved understanding of real issues
and real decisions.
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Ill . GAMING METHODOLOGY: APPLICATIONS
Having introduced gaming as a historical methodology for
strategic studies, it is now appropriate to consider its
usage. The latter portion of this chapter describes several
gaming applications of interest to the strategist, but to
fully appreciate these games it is first necessary to become
acquainted with their general composition. The next section,
entitled "Classification of Games," outlines the basic
structural attributes of war games.
A. CLASSIFICATION OF GAMES
War games may be classified in accordance with a variety
of standards. The six most common criteria are delineated
here: Level of Play, Level of Simulation, Structure of Play,
Information Limits, Number of Sides, and Purpose.
1 . Level of Play
Level of play describes a game in terms of Geographic
Scope, Level of Conflict and, most important, its Level of
Decisionmaking
.
As necessitated by the game's objectives, player
roles may be assigned at any level of decisionmaking, ranging
from small unit commander to national command authority.
Level of decisionmaking also establishes a level of
"jointness", or the extent to which the game requires
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inter-service and inter-agency cooperation and combined
effort (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-16). At the level of frigate
captain, for example, game play will deal principally with
naval operations; activities of ground forces, or diplomatic
endeavors, or the impact of domestic politics are largely
ignored
.
Most games of interest to strategic planners
designate decisionmaking at Fleet or Army level, or higher,
thus creating a need for combined operations. As a result,
many organizations will be depicted in the game, including
all military services, several executive departments and
agencies, the legislature, allies, and even a number of
private entities (business, the media, etc.).
Level of decisionmaking may also bears on selection
of an appropriate level of conflict and geographic scope. By
focusing on a single locality, a larger region or theater, or
encompassing the entire planet, a game's geographic scope
describes its spatial domain. Geographic scope also helps
define the character of military operations found in a game.
They may occur in any of several environments: air, sea, land
or space; and on any of several planes: tactical,
operational, or the sphere of interest in this thesis:
strategic (Perla and Barrett, 1985b, p. 72). And within the
game's geographic setting, a certain level of conflict will
be simulated. A game might portray conflict as limited local
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strife, or global nuclear war, or anywhere else along the
so-called escalation ladder.
2 . Level of Simulation
Level of simulation addresses the types of models
that support a game. There are two basic classes of
simulation used in games: manual and man-machine. Often
associated with the latter is another category: the fully
automated simulation.
a. Manual Games
Games in which models are op'rated by hand are
termed manual games. They are generally cheaper and easier to
set up and play than games using more elaborate computer
based models, although the advent of personal computers is
changing this situation. Another advantage to manual models
is their flexibility; it is a relatively simple matter to
alter them to accommodate unforeseen circumstances that may
ar ise in a game
,
The models of most manual games consist of tables
and/or graphs that provide the outcomes to a given situation,
such as combat. An important benefit of such manual models
is that they are fairly transparent; players can readily see
and understand the models' logic and procedures. Among other
things, this makes manual models useful as decisionmaking
aids, since they provide players with ready information on
how reality is expressed within the game's context (Per la,
1986, p. 19 )
.
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Manual games also possess some disadvantages.
Hand operated models can be slow and cumbersome , a serious
detriment if time is limited. In addition, they tend to be
labor-intensive, a distinct drawback for the large,
aggregated games of global proportion often required by
strategists
.
b. Man -machine games
Most man-machine games use automated models to
carry out the mechanical functions of gaming. By applying
state-of-the-art techniques in artificial intelligence, some
models also approximate certain aspects of human
decisionmaking .»
Modern computers offer significant advantages to
gaming. First, the incredible speed of automated systems can
dramatically increase the number of games being played,
"instead of running one or even a handful of games and
simulations each year, modern simulations centers will be
able to run literally hundreds of alternate cases."
(Hoffman, 1984, p. 820) Secondly, access to war game
methodology can be widely improved through portable personal
computers. The advent of micro-chip technology has also
greatly expanded the working capacity of even the smallest
computers and given rise to a third benefit: the ability to
•One notable application of artificial intelligence is
found in the Rand Strategy Assessment System ( RSAS ) . A
description of RSAS is supplied later in this chapter.
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handle large quantities of variables, thus allowing for more
detailed (and hopefully more realistic) simulations.
Unfortunately, many computer models lack the
transparency of their manually operated counterparts, a
condition that can lead players to mistrust or misunderstand
outcomes in man-machine games.* Computer-based games can also
be difficult for players to learn, since much of their
reality is hidden within the Black Box: " . . .players can no
longer see the relative odds generated by the models and so
f u.i it difficult to incorporate expectations about outcomes
into their decisions." (Perla, 1986, p. 20)
c. Fully Automated Simulations
Although they are related to gaming, fully
automated simulations in themselves are not games, since they
substitute computerized decision rules for human
decisionmakers. Recall that the definition of gaming requires
human play, while simulations do not:
The spectrum of gaming extends from the manual game to a
computer-assisted game in which human decisions are made
only at critical intervals. There is a further extension of
this spectrum to a complete computer procedure, more
appropriately called a simulation, where there is no
element of human decision involved in the complete run of
the conflict situation. (Hausrath, 1971, p. 127)
Simulations of this type are frequently used in analytic
studies, since they produce quantitative, replicable results.
*See Chapter IV for more discussion on the limitations of
automated models in games.
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3 . Structure of Play
Move schedules, Time Representation and Degrees of
Freedom are the primary determinants of a game's play
structure. First, move schedules can be set up that allow
player "turns" to occur sequentially or simultaneously, or
any combination thereof. Since they better replicate
real-world events, simultaneous moves are generally preferred
in strategic gaming, with the added advantage that they take
less real time to execute. On the other hand, sequential
gaming is a necessity when the Control group is small or
nonexistent, or when some special circumstances exist.
(Jones, 1986, pp. 8-9)
A second factor in structure of play is time
representation. Most games are played with turns of fixed
duration, but some "critical event" games use a flexible game
clock. In order to reduce "dead time" (where no meaningful
activity occurs), these games proceed from event to event,
rather than through fixed intervals (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-24).
Finally, play structure also establishes the degrees
of decisionmaking freedom allowed game umpires. Games are
classified either "Free" or "Rigid", depending on the amount
of controller subjectivity permitted. Free games (also
referred to as "seminar" games) function with a minimum of
rules, relying instead on umpire judgment to control play and
determine outcomes to player decisions. Because the rely so
heavily on personal knowledge and judgment, free games may
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run fairly quickly, and require minimal supporting
infrastructure. They are especially appropriate for dealing
with highly subjective issues like terrorism and arras control
negotiations, and since they give the instructor/umpire ready
ability to manipulate events, free games are also well-suited
for educational endeavors and for stimulating players to
surface new ideas
.
Where the worth of a free game "...depends on the
competence of the Controller..." the value of a rigid game
"
. .
.depends on the competence of the peo^flc who formulated
the rules." (Hausrath, 1971, p. 124) Rigid games prescribe
rules and procedures that replace much controller opinion in
conducting the game's adjudication, regulation, and
communication processes. Some rigid games also limit player
decisions to specific options, or require players to base
their decisions on certain rules or doctrines (McHugh, 1966,
p. 1-24). Rigid or "system" games are most useful when
isolation and manipulation of variables is desired. Since
they can be designed to produce measurable results, these
games are often used in analytic studies.
4 . Information Limits
Information limits regulate the quality and quantity
of intelligence available to players within the game. As in
real conflict, each side will base its decisions in part on
knowledge of opponent attitudes, intentions, and resources.
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Thus the flow of information (or lack thereof) can
significantly impact on game events.
As a function of their information limits, games are
grouped into one of two categories: open or closed. An
"open" game permits free and complete access to information
on one's opponent. When intelligence is limited to more
closely approximate real -world information flows, the game is
considered "closed." Because of their ability to better
simulate the "fog of war", closed games are most commonly
favored for planning purposes (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-18).
Unfortunately, they sometimes tend to move slowly, and often
require much infrastructure and support staff to conduct.
Open games have proven more useful when time, space or
umpires are at a premium, as they are relatively fast and
easy to run {Hausrath, 1971, p. 125). They are best suited
for educational applications, and for discovery of new ideas
and alternative futures.
5 . Number of Sides
The number of teams or sides participating in a game
may vary from one to many. One-sided games place a single
decisionmaking team against "Nature" , as represented by a
Control group or a computer simulation. Such games are often
used for educational purposes, as they allow the instructor
(as Control) to manipulate scenarios and outcomes in order to
highlight player errors, and reinforce specific ideas and
strategies (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-17).
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The most common structure for strategic games is
two-sided; teams represent two opposing nations or alliances,
with Control acting as intermediary (Jones, 1986, p. 6).
Another style used to examine strategic issues is the
multi -sided game, which attempts to capture the complex and
often confusing international environment by fielding three
or more teams, each representing a different nation or actor.
A variation of the multi -sided game features several teams
portraying a single side, thus allowing simultaneous but
varying .'st • ampts to beat the opponent*.
6 . Purpose
More than anything else gaming methodology deals with
ideas; the way a game treats ideas is the basis for its
classification by purpose. A game designed to teach ideas is
termed "educational", while games that aim at organizing,
analyzing and testing ideas is designated for "planning."
"Discovery" games are intended to search for and reveal new
ideas
.
No single game can truly be classified in just one
category, as every game possesses attributes of discovery,
planning, and education. For example, an educational game
helps students discover ideas new to themselves, even if
those ideas are not original. A planning game will likely
•An illustration of the mult i -side/single-nation game is
the parallel structure used in some pol it ical -mi 1 itary
seminar games, as described later in this chapter.
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turn out to be an enlightening and educational experience for
some of its participants. One quality possessed by almost
all games is integration: by bringing people of different
backgrounds and outlooks together, the game is usually an
"idea-sharing" device. Like few other experiences, the
interaction of players (and designers and analysts, and
policy-makers too) in a game fosters intellectual exchange in
which ideas are communicated, evaluated, and refined.
a. Education/Advocacy
Gaming has long been utilized as a learning tool.
The first "modern" war game, introduced in 1824 by Johann von
Reisswitz, was quickly adopted as a training device for
Prussian officers (Hausrath, 1971, pp. 6-7). In 1894, the
U.S. Naval War College established gaming as a regular part
of its curriculum, and has remained a leading war game center
ever since ( McHugh , 1966, p. 2-44). Within the educational
environment, gaming supplements conventional teaching
techniques by allowing students to actually experience the
subject matter, see their ideas in action, and safely learn
from their mistakes.
The importance of games in strategic education is
recognized by both academics and strategists. In 1955 a
professional war gaming conference held at the University of
Michigan declared gaming a vital element in the education of
senior military officers (McHugh, 1966, p. 1-26). More
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recently, Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, President
of the National Defense University, remarked:
As a pedagogical tool, wargaming has advantages that few
other teaching methods offer. Wargaming helps overcome the
barrier that so often separates theory from applications,
because the student can test theories by applying them to
"simulated" situations and observing the results.
(Lawrence, 1986, p. 22)
War games can teach ideas as they encourage
students to experiment and expand their horizons in a
risk-free environment. By helping to clarify abstract ideas,
they may supplement and build upon knc 1 jdge acquired through
other means. Games are especially suited to improve
understanding of a number of strategic issues, including:
the use and nature of national policy instruments, strategic
decisionmaking processes (both own and opponent's),
intelligence planning and collection, and the role of
signaling and communications. They also offer a means to
evaluate how well students take aboard new concepts.
(Lawrence, 1986, p. 23)
Employed as advocacy tools, war games can also
teach outside the classroom. Strategists and analysts often
design and conduct games meant to show others the merits of a
new idea, system or strategy:
A competent designer can build a bias of almost any kind
and degree into a game or simulation. Advocates of specific
policies or weapons systems can load the dice so that the
[war game] is most likely to produce the results they want
to see. (Brewer and Shubik, 1979, p. 14)
Such advocacy games , however , should not be taken at face
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value. "Any advocacy espoused as the result of a wargame
,
without supporting analysis," warns one naval gamer, "should
be exposed and questioned." (Euliss, 1985, p. 98)
b. Planning
Some authorities credit the Chinese strategist Sun
Tzu with the first employment of games as military planning
aids around 500 B.C. ( Kapper , 1981, p. 22). Certainly
planning and evaluation are important use for war games
today, and possibly the most prevalent. In a survey of
models/simulations/games (MSGs) published by Garry D. Brewer
and Martin Shubik in 1979, over 85% of the MSGs examined
listed a planning-related function as their primary
application (Brewer and Shubik, 1979, p. 163).
Gaming supports the planning process by
encouraging strategists to organize and test their ideas.
Games can assist in strategy development, in originating and
evaluating new operational concepts and doctrines, and in
assessment of new weapons systems. By allowing planners to
examine any number of own and enemy courses of action, games
can aid in contingency analysis. (Thompson, 1983, p. 87) The
full utility of gaming as a planning tool is suggested by
some recent applications:
- evaluation of employment plans for strategic nuclear
forces
;
- evaluation of various force structures to support arms
control negotiations;
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- assessment of conventional warfighting capabilities, both
friendly and opponent;
- examination and evaluation of the military/political
aspects of national security policy and strategy; and
- evaluation of joint force operations. (Sims, 1987, p. 2)
Because they encourage unconventional perspectives,
games can help planners and policy-makers identify and
evaluate hidden assumptions. This is especially important
when working with analytic methodologies, where assumptions
may not be c-plicit. Used in conjunction with analysis,
gaming helps validate and impart operational reality to
models, generates outcome distributions for crisis and
conflict situations, gives visibility to outliers, and aids
in organizing and targeting information for further analysis
(Martin and Olin, 1982, p. 55). Heavily computerized games
are the natural preference of analysts for these ends.
From a practical standpoint, the most important
planning application for gaming may be as an integrating
device. Game experiences often serve as structured
discussions where the "...integration of pertinent
information and decisions usually raises new issues, helps
confirm and qualify expected problems, points to omissions of
consideration and even to potential solutions of problems..."
(Euliss, 1985, p. 97) When used as a vehicle for group
planning, war games can show how to fit the strategic pieces
together. They can be designed to foster consensus by fusing
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diverse ideas held by different people into coherent,
workable plans. Conversely, games can be structured to
facilitate innovative and independent thought with the hope
of discovering new ideas,
c. Discovery
While most gamers recognize the war game's ability
to reveal "what we don't know we don't know," the potential
for gaming methodology as a heuristic device is still largely
untapped (Perla, 1985b, p. 78). Yet, an imaginatively
designed and competently run game is a stimulating
experience; it can force participants to challenge existing
paradigms and to shock them into "thinking the unthinkable."
Such games give rise to whole new views of reality as they
bring fundamental assumptions and conventional wisdom into
question
.
In its role as "paradigm-buster," gaming can help
alter the strategic mindset of the participant in favorable
ways. One advocate of gaming sees war games as means to "get
away from Douhet , " return to the strategic fundamentals first
articulated by Sun Tzu , "and figure out how to get at the
enemy's mind, strategies, alliances, armies, and cities, in
that order."* Innovative techniques such as path games may
•Remark by Capt . Charles C. Pease USN , Ret. (Pease,
1987) Giulio Douhet was an Italian air force officer who,
following World War I, strongly advocated victory through air
power. Douhet postulated that air campaigns of terror
bombing would quickly break the enemy's will to resist and
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help reduce the "tunnel vision" of American strategic
culture. Path games encourage players to pursue multiple
paths towards some distant objective. They cover extended
periods of time during which both strategies and force
structures may undergo significant changes. »» Someone with
path game experience may be less preoccupied with short-term
issues (a classic American foible), and focus rather on long
term interests and goals having far greater import.
Serious application of gaming as a tool for
systematic discovery of new ideas has only just begun. One
notable example is revealed in the Defense Department's
Office of Net Assessment, where a group of strategists under
Andrew Marshall has merged gaming into a mult i -discipl inary
approach to develop long-term competitive strategies (Mann,
1987, p. 13; Durnan , 1987). If games devoted specifically to
brainstorming new ideas and developing radical new
perspectives are scarce, it must also be noted that most war
games present some opportunity for "discovery" , whereby
unexpected results are obtained:
. .
.the game sets up a process that by its nature produces a
compel his surrender. His theories helped inspire the
strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War, and are
echoed in contemporary "assured destruction" doctrines.
(Dupuy and Dupuy , 1977, pp. 995, 1024)
••Most conventional games are "state" games; they examine
issues over a fairly short time span, during which force
structures and strategies (and paradigms) do not funda-
mentally change (Masterson and Tritten, 1987, pp. 118-119).
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dynamic sequence of actions, response and counteractions.
This sequential process, once set in motion, moves ahead
under a momentum of its own, often in quite logical and
plausible directions not always foreseen. A kind of chain
reaction takes place beyond the capacity of a single mind
to anticipate. (Bloomfield and Whaley, 1965, p. 870)
B. GAMES STRATEGISTS PLAY: SOME SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
Knowledge of war game structure and classification will
help the reader better understand the game descriptions that
follow. Three different games or game types are presented:
Political -Mi litary Seminar Games, the Rand Strategy
Assessment System, and Global War Games. While they are by
no means representative of the huge selection of games, both
professional and commercial, available in the United States
today, the three are of special interest to the strategist.*
1 . Political -Military Seminar Games
(1) LEVEL OF PLAY: National command authority.
(2) STRUCTURE OF PLAY: Free.
(3) LEVEL OF SIMULATION: Manual (limited computer support
may be provided).
(4) NUMBER OF SIDES: Usually two or three; sometimes more.
(5) INFORMATION LIMITS: Closed.
(6) PURPOSE: Education, Planning; some Discovery.
Comprehensive listings of professional war games are
found in: Quadripartite Working Group on Army Operational
Research, Catalog of War Games and Combat Simulations . Office
of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, Washington D.C.,
April 1982.; and Quattromani , A.F., Catalog of Wargaming and
Military Simulation Models
. 9th. ed. , Studies and Analysis
Gaming Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May
1982. In addition, a slightly dated index of commercial
games is contained in: The Staff of Strategy and Tactics
Magazine, Wargame Design
. Hippocrene Books, 1983.
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Political -military seminar games are a post World War
II phenomenon, having evolved from the pioneer efforts of Dr.
Herbert Goldhamer , who developed them at RAND Corporation
during the raid-fifties. In their original conception, these
seminar garacc were seen primarily as training devices, but
their value for strategic planning was early recognized and
expanded upon (Mandel, 1977, pp. 612-613).
Contemporary political -mil itary seminar games blend
political, military, economic, social, psychological,
technological , and other elements into scenarios that address
potential international crises. Within these simulated
environments
,
players can examine the character of
international crises while developing decisionmaking skills
that may someday be applied in real -world situations. Game
scenarios are diverse. They can be tailored to depict topical
issues, such as terrorism or arras control negotiations, or
they raay focus on problems within a specific geographic
region, like the Middle East, or Latin America, or Europe.
Because of their flexibility and unique ability to capture
important subjective qualities of international relations,
seminar games are used by strategists to:
- identify national security interests, difficulties, and
opportunities, and generate recommendations for strategy
and policy;
- discover meaningful approaches to crisis management and
develop contingency plans;
- identify and examine the nature and location of potential
international crises; and
- assist the net assessment process. (Sims, 1987, pp. 3-6)
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While they are by no means prolific, political-
military seminar games have been played at several important
seats of strategic thought. Besides the RAND Corporation,
these include various other think tanks and universities
(most notably MIT), all of the service colleges, the CIA, the
State Department, and the Department of Defense (Kapper,
1981, p. 19). Possibly the most well-known center for
political -mi litary seminar games, at least within the
strategic gaming community, is the Force, Structure, Resource
and Assessment Directorate (J-8), an organ of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
While a number of different game structures are
available, the design of seminar games used by J-8
demonstrate two common variations.* Most J-8 games group
players into three sides or teams. In an interesting
departure from conventional gaming practice, one of the teams
is always designated as Control; the game's controllers are
players, rather than members of the gaming facility staff.
The other two teams are placed either in an "adversary" or
"parallel" relationship. In an adversary game, the two teams
oppose each other as separate Red and Blue nations or actors,
For example, eight different structures for
pol itical -mi 1 itary seminar games are suggested in: Rand
Corporation Report N-2413-AF/A On the Adapting of Political
Military Games for Various Purposes , by William M. Jones,
March 1986.
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while a parallel formation creates two teams representing the
same side. The latter structure is especially useful for
comparative studies, and is regarded as highly productive
since it effectively plays two games in one (Sims, 1987, p.
5).
An important characteristic of the teams in many
political -mi litary seminar games is the lack of role
assignments for individual players. Instead, each team acts
as a corporate body. Starting with the initial scenario, the
team discusses the issues at hand, evaluates the situacion,
generates strategies and options, develops a consensus, and
finally submits its formal "move" to Control. With the moves
of both teams in hand, the controllers conduct a similar
discussion-evaluation-options-consensus process to arrive at
outcomes. Their efforts usually result in a new or modified
scenario. Each game turn repeats this cycle, normally for a
total of three turns.
Of all the types of war gaming in use today,
political -mi litary seminar games, especially those conducted
within the Departments of Defense and State, quite possibly
have thf cost profound impact on policy. While there is some
dispute on the true effectiveness of these games, the fact
that high-ranking officials and officers sometimes attend,
participate in, and endorse them is significant. (Brewer and
Shubik, 1979, pp. 35,281; Visco, 1987, pp. 19-22)
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2 . Rand Strategy Assessment System
(1) LEVEL OF PLAY: Variable; national command authority to
theater command levels.
(2) STRUCTURE OF PLAY: Rigid.
(3) LEVEL OF SIMULATION: Variable; fully automated or
computer -supported human play.
(4) NUMBER OF SIDES: Two.
(5) INFORMATION LIMITS: Closed.
(6) PURPOSE: Planning, Education.
By blending the contextual richness and operational
complexity of war games with the rigor and transparency of
quantitative models, the Rand Strategy Assessment System
( RSAS ) has something to offer for strategists and analysts
alike. Although RSAS is advertised is an analytic simulation
structured as a game, when human players replace its
computerized "agents" in decisionmaking roles, it i_s a game
(Davis, Stan, and Bennett, 1983, p. 2). And according to one
of its designers, RSAS is easier to use, more thorough, more
rigorous, and faster than most pol it i cal -mil itary games
(Shlapak, 1987).
Like most standard war games, the RSAS pits Red and
Blue opponents against each other through a Control entity.
In the case of RSAS, however, the Red and Blue "players", and
Control, are all represented by computerized agents. Blue
Agent is a depiction of the American/NATO national command
hierarchy, while Red Agent portrays the Soviet/Warsaw Pact
equivalent. Control consists of Green Agent, Force Agent, and
the System Monitor. Third countries, pro-Red, pro-Blue, and
neutral, are resident in Green Agent. Force Agent provides
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the mechanism whereby forces are moved and fought, and the
System Monitor coordinates interactions between agents, in
addition to serving as the simulation's record-keeper.
Artificial intelligence (AI ) techniques are used to
approximate human national command level (NCL) decisionmaking
for the Blue and Red Agents. The NCL models are called "Ivan"
and "Sam" , and the analyst/player may select any one of
several "personalities" for each.» The personality chosen for
Sam or Ivan determines the types of escalation guidance and
national objectives Ccich bring to the game. The
decisionmaking models function by appraising the situation,
and selecting potential courses of action, or "war plans"
consistent with escalation guidance and national objectives.
Using a "look ahead" routine, each war plan is tested for
feasibility, and one is selected for execution. As neither
Ivan nor Sam are allowed perfect intelligence on opponent
actions and status, both models make these assessments and
»Ivan/Sam personalities are defined by four sets of
traits: flexibility attributes, political attributes,
warfighting style, and perceptual attributes. Under
flexibility attributes, for example, Ivan may be flexible,
limit-setting, or resolute in setting its objectives. At the
same time, Sam's operational daring (a subset o-f warfighting
style) may be characterized as daring, open, or standard.
Provided with a number of different Ivans and Sams, each with
a different personality, the RSAS user may select the Ivan or
Sam that best conforms to a preferred image of American
and/or Soviet decisionmaking style. (Davis, Bankes, and
Kahan, 1986, pp. 38-41 )
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decisions under the "fog of war." (Davis, Stan, and Bennett,
1983
, p. 4)
Once chosen, the war plan is sent to subordinate
levels for execution. Decisionmaking below the NCL is handled
by a succession of models which approximate real U.S. /NATO
and Soviet/Warsaw Pact command structures. Each of these
subordinates follows the script set out by the NCL's war
plan, and is capable of making limited adaptations to cover
unforeseen circumstances. In addition, each war plan
contains "wake-up" rules that tell the subordinate levels
when to seek further guidance from the NCL. If a commander
finds itself unable to adjust to emergent circumstances, a
wake-up rule is triggered to re- initiate the NCL
assessment/decision cycle. (Bennett and Davis, 1984, p. 5)
The designers of RSAS see three major applications
for their creation:
- fully automated analytic tool;
- man -machine war game, where human players oppose one or
more computerized agents; and
- scenario generation/a judication tool to support
conventionally structured games. (Shlapak, 1985, p. 1)
As a simulation, RSAS gives an analyst the ability to
manipulate a wide variety of pol it ical -mi 1 itary variables and
examine their effect. It is also fast, running a 30 day war
on Europe's central front in approximately one hour (Davis,
1985, p. 20). Such speed enables a wide range of issues to
be examined in a shorter amount of time.
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Used as a game, RSAS allows human players to replace
any agent, at any decisionmaking level. When human teams are
not available (Red teams are especially difficult to put
together, since good experts on the USSR are relatively
scarce) the agents themselves can be used as opponents
(Masterson and Tritten, 1987, p. 118). Besides selecting
among Ivans and Sams, the player/analyst may also select from
a variety of temperaments for each third country represented
in Green Agent, ranging from staunchly pro-Blue to neutral to
staunchly pro-Red (Shlapak and others, 1986, p. vi ) . To
facilitate human interaction, Rand has developed a relatively
friendly language known as RAND-ABEL for use with the RSAS
(Bennett and Davis, 1984, p. 5).
3 . Global War Games
(1) LEVEL OF PLAY: Multiple; national command authority to
theater command levels.
(2) STRUCTURE OF PLAY: Multiple; both rigid and free.
(3) LEVEL OF SIMULATION: Multiple; both manual and
man-machine systems used.
(4) NUMBER OF SIDES: Many.
(5) INFORMATION LIMITS: Mostly closed, although some open
play may occur
.
(6) PURPOSE: Planning, Discovery.
The final example of gaming applications is the
global war game: a highly aggregated strategic - level game
that combines many game systems. Most global games include
hundreds of players and analysts, experts from diverse
organizations and institutions: naval and military officers
(including many flag officers), legislators, policy-makers
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and staffers from many government agencies and departments,
businessmen, civilian strategists, and many more (Hay, 1987a,
p. 8; Browning, 1984, p. 109). And while a host of strategic
and operational issues are scrutinized, major emphasis is
also placed on examining the relationship between war and
politics. "The political -diplomat ic interaction," remarks one
global game participant, "played a more significant role than
I envisioned, and gave me a greater insight into the impact
of such considerations on military theater operations."
(Browning, 1984, p. Ill)
Prominent examples of global gaming are found at two
service colleges: the National Defense University in
Washington D.C., home of the Proud Prophet games; and the
Naval War College in Newport R.I., where the decade-old
Global War Game series is conducted. Because of their size
and structure, global games played at these and other
locations can effectively examine a diversity of strategic
issues. These include:
- strategic concepts for joint and combined campaigns;
- theater priorities in global conflict situations;
- the impact of different strategies on opponent
de c i s i onmak i ng
;
- the role of diplomacy as part of national strategy;
- mobilization, public safety, and war economics/finance
issues
;
- the impact of domestic politics, public opinion, and the
media on conduct of a protracted war;
- logistical problems associated with protracted global
war ;
- escalation, de-escalation, and war termination concepts;
and
- the impact of advanced technology on war -fight ing
.
(United States Naval War College, 1987, pp. 3-4)
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Global games usually integrate a number of different
game striictures. On the national policy level, play is
conducted in the form of political -mi litary seminars, while
in the theater commands ("at the front," so to speak), the
game is played with support from computerized air, ground
and/or naval combat models, as appropriate. In effect, a
global game consists of myriad mini -games, each examining
some facet of political activity or military operations
within the overarching context of a simulated global
conflict.* And while the lidi.i -games cover specific topics in
detail, they also feed back to the main scenario, thus
providing a richness and complexity unavailable through other
types of games: "The global war game is the only setting in
which all of the factors that impact on strategies are looked
at simultaneously and realistically." (Connors, 1984, p. 108)
•Typical mini -games may address alliance relations,
international economics, conventional military and naval
activity (by theater), global logistics, space as a theater
of war, nuclear and chemical warfare, domestic politics,
communications/negotiations between belligerents, and many
other topics (Hay, 1987a, p. 2).
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF GAMING
No methodology is perfect, and gaming is no exception.
The strategist must be wary of the potential distortions and
artificialities present in gaming, the exact nature of which
may vary in accordance with differing game objectives. Where
discovery games may be badly inhibited by excessive model
structure, this same structure may be desirable, or even
essential, for a planning game. Most educational games
require carefully contrived and controlled scenarios to focus
student learning, while other types of games eschew these
deterministic scenarios. Some games demand high quality Red
play, but in other games such play is less important.
War game users must contend with distortions from
analysis and analytic models: the limits of the Black Box.
They also face limits beyond the Black Box: artificialities
imposed by scenarios and human nature. But the problems and
limitations of war games, both from within and without the
Black Box, are not insurmountable. Most of them are
minimized through proper validation procedures.
A. THE INNER LIMITS OF GAMES: PROBLEMS WITHIN THE BLACK BOX
For all the benefits of automation, the Black Box is
truly a Pandora's Box for the strategist. If automated gaming
systems are fast, portable, and capable, they are likewise
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expensive to build and maintain. Computer models often
require much time and effort to develop, and if not "user
friendly," they also consume considerable man-hours to learn
how to run.
While computerized games allow for more precise control
over variables, they are not omniscient. A computer -defined
universe, even at best, is a finite universe, never able to
fully simulate the real world faced by policy-makers. "If
good models are available," an experienced gamer remarks "one
wonders why the game play is needed at all." (Thompson, 1983,
p. 86)
Even the best models are not perfect representations of
reality, and game play is required to flesh out qualitative
issues that models cannot address. Nevertheless,
mathematical models (particularly computer models) are
useful, perhaps indispensable tools for many modern war
games. The strategist, as the analyst, should be familiar
with the strengths and weaknesses of models; he must
understand how models, both good and bad, may exert
undesirable influences on war games.
1 . Bad Models: A Question of Worth
Since quantitative models are frequently needed to
represent actual physical and human processes within the
contrived environment of gaming, the accuracy with which
reality is depicted depends significantly on the authenticity
of a game's models. Poor models are usually deficient in the
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quality of their data bases and/ or the verity of their
simulation processes. As Brewer notes:
...most defense studies [including war games] that rely
heavily on mathematical and statistical techniques are
vulnerable on at least two counts: (1) Data inputs have
obscure, unknown, or unknowable empirical foundations, and
the relevance of much data to the important matters at
issue, even if valid, is seldom established. (2) The
models, and the behavioral propositions and assumptions on
which they are based, are not often reliable or validated.
(Brewer, 1984, p. 803)
War games using models that function with inaccurate
data and/or implausible simulation mechanisms may lead to
game results with little or no meaning, and are potentially
dangerous. Since model deficiencies are often difficult to
identify, they may lead to delusive game experiences that
convey false conclusions. On the policy level, "...misplaced
emphasis, unwarranted confidence, and unwise resource
allocation..." may result from games in which bad models
"...conceal spurious content beneath protective layers of
mathematics and statistics." (Brewer, 1984, p. 803)
2 . Good Models: The Tyranny of the Computer
As stated earlier, even good models cannot fully
capture reality. Gamers, particularly those involved with
games of discovery, must be especially wary lest their
insights become unnecessarily constrained by presuppositions
hidden within the Black Box. "Computer models entail rigid
assumptions," comments an experienced game director, "and so
the computer may limit free play," (Hay, 1987b)
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The "Tyranny of the Computer" tends to suppress the
very qualitative, intangible properties that gaming is
intended to "liberate." (Hausrath, 1971, p. 268) Heavily
automated games, however useful, are particularly susceptible
to fixed constraints imposed by their models. Imaginatively
used, computer models are powerful tools, facilitating
examination of whole new areas of strategic knowledge. But
if participants are unintentionally lulled into a routine of
"default gaming," the game becomes little more than a
computer simulation, and hum-'' n participation may not be
meaningful (Pease, 1987).
B. THE OUTER LIMITS OF GAMES: PROBLEMS BEYOND THE BLACK BOX
Outside the Black Box, games are subject to a variety of
elements that may reduce their effectiveness. Considered here
are four of them: quality of scenario, human temperament,
playing Red, and the authenticity of game decisions.
1 . Quality of Scenarios
Good scenarios are as important to gaming as good
models. Like bad models, bad scenarios will cause focus to
shift from the game itself; players will spend most of their
time trying to understand the scenario (or picking it apart),
rather than playing. But even well -constructed scenarios have
their limitations. As do models, scenarios implicitly limit
player options. Because they "...describe the future --as
projected, assumed, speculated or hypothesized..." by their
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authors, scenarios "...foreordain the results and conclusions
of military planning studies." (Builder, 1983, p. v)
The complex nature of contemporary international
affairs demands a variety of broad scenarios. Scenarios
narrowly focused on just a few issues are unrealistic and
result in strategic myopia. On the other hand, imaginative
and comprehensive scenarios will stimulate broad strategic
vision:
. . .a complete wargame should not deal only with the armed
conflict portion of war. To do so will lead participants
to believe that escalation decisions only involve moving up
and down the so-called vertical escalation ladder or
expanding/ limiting armed conflict horizontally beyond or to
theaters of origin. A more correct representation of war
involving political, economic, moral and similar areas
would reveal that escalation also involves economic
warfare, world public opinion, actions by allies, and the
very crucial variable of time. (Tritten, 1987, p. 5)
Several gaming experts feel that some strategic games
feature in weak or deficient scenarios. "The top levels of
the U.S. political and military leadership," writes
strategic gaming pioneer Lincoln P. Bloorafield,
"could .. .benefit from more sophisticated political
simulations of all too common situations of no-war/no-peace,
learning how better to manage such crises with a view towards
mutual de-escalation." (Bloomfield, 1984, p. 790) Recent
suggestions to improve scenario design and validity could, if
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properly utilized, provide the types of game context that
Bloorafield advocates.*
2 . Human Temperament
Human nature plays a central role in gaming, and if
it is manifested more explicitly in war games than in other
methodologies, it is still problemical. Players, umpires,
and sponsors can easily defeat the purpose of a game with
ignorance and prejudicial attitudes.
Lack of preparation is a problem in many educational
and planning type war games that require players to be
cognizant of game issues in advance. Poor preparation is
sometimes caused by failure of the gaming facility to provide
pertinent information on game requirements, objectives, and
scenario before the game begins. It also results from
participants' inability or unwillingness to ready themselves
for play. Consequently, much time may be lost bringing
negligent and ignorant players up to speed at the outset of
these kinds of games.
Among more experienced and better prepared gamers,
prejudicial attitudes may interfere with game results. If
they loose sight of game objectives, players may find
»For more information on the design and improvement of
scenarios see: Center for Naval Analysis Report CRM-86-50,
Wargame Design. Development, and Play , by Peter P. Perla, pp
9-20, February 1986. Also see: Rand Corporation Report
N-1855-DNA, Toward A Calculus of Scenarios , by Carl H.
Builder, January 1983.
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themselves playing more against Control instead of their
designated supposed opponent. Some players go into a game
with the notion that "victory" must be achieved at any cost,
and end up trying to beat the game's models rather than the
enemy team (Masterson and Tritten, 1987, p. 119). While good
Control groups can usually overcome these problems, umpires
may themselves intentionally or unintentionally bias
judgments. And Control may also be forced to contend with
misplaced sponsor expectations of what the game should and
should not accomplish.
Role-playing sometimes presents a major challenge in
games that assign players specific decisionmaking authority.
Even the most conscientious participants may express
incredulity when faced with unanticipated outcomes: "...the
most difficult time for all players and controllers to keep
within their roles occurs when assessment results are
supported, especially when those results differ from player
expectations." (Perla, 1986, p. 29) Furthermore, "Friday
afternoon syndrome" is almost inevitable. As a game's
deadline approaches, play tends to get sloppy; participants
become more concerned about catching flights home than in
playing out roles to the bitter end.
3 . Playing Red
During the 1960s, it was commonplace for both sides
in a war game to play out doctrines, strategies, values and
outlooks that were essentially "Blue" in character. (McHugh,
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1966, p. 1-30) This situation is now changing. Many American
strategists have recently awakened to the notion that Soviet
thinking on matters of war, politics, and strategy are not a
simple mirror image of their own:
Soviet strategic policy cannot be likened to a loose gun
carriage on a rolling deck (indeed, that simile more nearly
approximates the enduring U.S. policy condition); it is not
eccentric, irrational .. .or even particularly mysterious in
its driving motivations and its goals. However, it is
different from US. policy; it cannot be approached in
familiar American terms. (Gray, 1986, p. 65)
That the gaming community shares in the growing
appreciation of the Soviet Union's unique strategic culture
is demonstrated by the proliferation of special groups of
experts versed in Soviet military history and practices,
educated and trained to "think Red." These professional Red
players, like the Naval Operational Intelligence Center cell
at the U.S. Naval War College, the Army's Red Team, and the
Air Force's Checkmate Unit, bring a certain Soviet-like
expertise to war gaming.
Despite recent improvements. Red play is still
considered by many to be a major stumbling block. If expert
Red players are gaining pre-eminence, some games still field
poorly prepared personnel that "...just shift sides from Blue
to Red." (Allen, 1987, p. 39) Even among the more
sophisticated Red teams, deficiencies exist in non-military
play due to a lack of participants with sufficient knowledge
in Soviet politics, economics, and society outside the narrow
military sphere (Hoffman, 1984, p. 818). Experiments with
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Soviet immigrants have produced opposite results. Despite
their intimate familiarity with Russian culture, few
immigrants are adequately informed on Soviet national
security decisionmaking to be of use in strategic games.
In pursuit of better Red play, the gaming community
is following several approaches. Automated systems such as
RSAS (when applied with care and full knowledge of their
limitations), offer one solution. By combining expert
knowledge with artificial intelligence, such systems produce
a ready-made "Red Team" of sufficient quality to offer
meaningful game play. Another answer is found in the design
of scenarios. Some experts advocate building a few scenarios
"bottom up from Red's perspective," because too many games
place Red players in situations totally unreasonable from the
Soviet point of view (Giesler and Sloan, 1987). Many new
insights would certainly be gained by playing Blue (as well
as Red) in such a Red context.
4 . Game Decisions and Reality
Enthusiasts may acclaim gaming for its realism
(especially when compared to other methodologies), but game
reality is deceptive:
...people do not die, and the balance of world power does
not hinge upon the game's outcome. Since not as much is
riding on the decisions, players might be more aggressive,
flamboyant, or in some cases, overly cautious, than they
would be in the real world. Thus, while the decision
process looks reasonably genuine, the decisions may not
ring true. (Thompson, 1984, p. 85)
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Although they approximate certain aspects of
decisionmaking quite well, games cannot capture every
influence acting on the real-life decisionmaker. Courage,
fatigue, charisma and other intangibles often defy even
qualitative treatment. » The impact of routine distractions,
such as meetings, reports, and administrative tasks are
normally minimized. Finally, games are incapable of
simulating the awful burden of responsibility shouldered by
real policy-makers and military officers in actual conflict
situations: "the lack of real pressure on players is a major
game distortion. People simply will act differently when
actually being fired upon." (Hoffman, 1984, p. 819) After
all, how does one simulate the unthinkable?
D. WAR GAME VALIDATION
A war game's validity is defined as "...the extent to
which its processes and results represent real problems and
issues opposed to artificial ones generated by the gaming
environment." (Perla, 1985a, p. 19) In most planning and
discovery applications, validation is the key to effective
utilization of war games.** If he is to apply game-derived
*Some of these characteristics are better addressed by
field exercises and maneuvers using actual forces. In
addition, it is possible to model the some of the effects of
these traits by altering parameters (force effectiveness, for
example), within the war game.
Validation is less important for educational or
advocacy purposes, where the instructor/controller
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knowledge to real problems, the strategist must be satisfied
that the game's decisions and events are plausible: that
they are reasonable facsimiles of reality. To sort out
game-induced distortions and misrepresentations from genuine
issues and insights, the strategist must employ procedures of
validation
.
Many games, including strategic games, apparently suffer
from lack of validation. In their 1979 study. Brewer and
Shubik criticized both the poor quality of most game
evaluations and the resistance of the professional gaming
community to any improvements (Brewer and Shubik, 19 79, p.
73, 185-187, 252-253). Five years later the situation seemed
little improved, as Brewer again chided war gamers for the
"...undeveloped state of validation," and "neglect
of ... sensitivity analysis and scrutiny of work for its
relevance to realistic conditions." (Brewer, 1984, p. 809)
While the validity of a game's models may be established
through stringent scientific testing, the same cannot be said
of the game as a whole. Since most game outcomes are
subjective and not readily measurable, they do not lend
themselves well to rigorous validation procedures. Instead,
the validity of war games is "more a matter of judgment than
precise measurement." (Hausrath, 1971, p. 287)
deliberately contrives and manipulates game mechanics and
scenarios to facilitate learning.
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Many people consider a war game's validity to be
self-evident, a matter of simple common sense. As war game
scholar Robert Mandel points out:
. .
.most users of professional level war games do not
subject these exercises [war games] to systemic validation
efforts because these officials assume, with a kind of
"practice -makes -per feet " mentality, that these exercises
are inherently valid. (Mandel, 1985, p. 494)
While common sense is an entirely appropriate validation
device for war games, it must be applied as part of a
structured, methodical validation plan. Such a plan could
evaluate the game in terms of each ui its components:
(1) Validity of Mechanics
- Are the assumptions and theories underlying models
explicit? Are they credible?
- Are models faithful to their underlying theory and
assumptions?
- Are model systems and results consistent with the
actual physical and human processes that they
approximate?
(2) Validity of Scenario
- Is the scenario plausible? Does it account for
differences in strategic culture between opponents?
- How do the scenario's assumptions influence player
decisionmaking? Does it allow genuine decisionmaking
flexibility, or does it render the game a foregone
conclusion?
(3) Validity of Participant Decisions
- Are opposing sides played with cultural realism or
are they mirror images of each other?
- How does player knowledge and attitude color game
decisions? Are players sincerely playing out their
roles?
- How well do player decisions reflect the gravity
of the game's simulated conflict situation? Do the
players take risks similar to those expected in
real-life?
Game reports and documentation should include sufficient
information to permit post-game researchers to establish
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validity using questions like those above. The specific
questions posed by a given validation plan would of course
vary according to different types of war games, and different
game objectives. But the basic purpose of validation will not
vary: to identify and assess the impact of game
artificialities on player decisions and game events.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The resurgence of war gaming interest manifested by the
contemporary American defense community is, for the most
part, well-placed and well-founded. Despite their
limitations, strategic/pol i t ical -mi 1 i tary games (as well as
their operational and tactical counterparts) can produce
unique and illuminating perspectives on many complex security
issues. Such games offer a mult i -dimens ional medium for
strategic education, planning and discovery, largely because
of their ability to capture and convey qualities beyond the
reach of conventional analytic techniques.
While recognizing the substantial potential of war games,
caution must nevertheless be exercised in their application.
Too much faith in any single methodology, including gaming,
is often a mistake. The strategist should remember that games
simply cannot address every aspect of the problems he may
confront
.
A. THE WAR GAME: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
"In general," comments Robert Mandel, "war games appear
most necessary when other approaches to military analysis are
costly, risky, ethically controversial, or simply
unavailable." (Mandel, 1985, p. 485) If rigor and
replication are needed, as in the study of phenomena subject
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mainly to the physical paradigm, treatment with analytical
methods is probably more in order. This is because the
"human" factor so important to games also renders them
virtually impossible to fully control variables and reproduce
results with precision. First, busy schedules make it
difficult to gather the exact same players for repeat games.
Second, as a person gains experience in a game, his judgment
and decisionmaking is inevitably influenced by familiarity
with game context and mechanics, as well as by knowledge of
previous game outcomes. Thus, even if the same people are
available to participate in multiple iterations of a game,
the analyst can never be sure how much their decisions are
effected by learning derived from earlier play. Even the best
validation techniques cannot begin to separate "game wise"
decisions from authentic ones under such circumstances.
If, on the other hand, the topics under consideration are
related more to the historical paradigm, the methodology of
gaming is entirely appropriate. Precision and r epl i cabi 1 i ty
are not necessarily prerequisites for meaningful examination
of many qualitative strategic issues, and it is to the study
of these hard-to-measure attributes that war games should be
ut i 1 i zed
.
Having determined the applicability of the war game to
the issues at hand, the strategist must design and conduct
his gaming with care. Human nature being what it is, the
artificialities of gaming are sometimes easy to overlook,
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especially in a we 1 1 -deve loped game with highly believable
scenarios and mechanics: "War games attempt to create the
illusion of reality and where this has been done
successfully, the game can be a powerful and sometimes
insidious influence, especially on those who have limited
operational experience." (Perla, 1985b, p. 77), Thus the
war game is double-edged sword. Where it can impart a sense
of strategic reality to otherwise recondite ideas, it can





In a study entitled Unintended Consequences of Strategic
Gaming , Paul Bracken identifies three undesirable results
fostered by games and simulations, or rather their
misapplication: unintended learning, diverted attention, and
suppressed possibilities (Bracken, 1977, pp. 312-315). These
represent some of the more deleterious effects of the gaming
sword
.
Many war games are intended to serve the purposes of
education or advocacy: they are designed to teach specific
lessons to participants. Extra caution must be exercised by
the designers and users of such games, lest they backfire and
foster unintended and undesired learning. Games are powerful
tools, and the wrong lessons and wrong conclusions can make
just as strong an impression as the "right" ones.
A war game that "proves" or "disproves" the efficacy of a
plan or strategy should be regarded with extreme skepticism,
72
as it may deceive the strategist by diverting his attention
from other important issues. Since it cannot address every
determinant of strategy, a single game (or even a series of
games) cannot be taken as the final word on a given matter.
The strategist must realize that the war game is not a "test"
in the sense of an absolute standard meant to be passed or
failed. Instead it is a way to examine the qualities of an
idea or strategy. War games do not prove anything, but they
do suggest how an idea might play out in a dynamic real -world
setting. Gaming should engender questions and hypotheses, not
answers and proofs. Rather than divert attention away from
seemingly "resolved" issues, proper understanding and
application of gaming methodology will raise issues to be
evaluated by other means.
Game-induced distortions may result in the inadvertent
suppression of certain future possibilities and outcomes.
For this reason, the strategist should not use gaming as a
methodology for prediction. War games are simply too
vulnerable to subjective inauthenticities to be effective
forecasting devices. Indeed, many types of
pol itical -mi litary games intentionally incorporate
unpredictability into their designs so as to better
approximate actual human conditions. Excessive belief in game
results is usually a recipe for self-deception and
unrealistic policy: the strategist "...cannot blithely treat
the game experiences as if they were the same as
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corresponding experiences in the real world." (Thompson,
1983, pp. 87) Gaming is best employed as a means to build and
explore alternative scenarios of the future, not as a crystal
ball .
B. UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF WAR GAMING
Historically oriented and political -mi litar i ly educated
strategists must more fully investigate the theory,
applications, and epistemology of war games if they are to
unlock the best potential of gaming methodology. The
objective of their research is a better understanding of the
impact of game artificialities, and how to compensate for
them with proper validation procedures.
Some experts suggest that various elements of analytical
theory are relevant to games: organizational theory, small
group theory, communications theory, and decision theory, to
name a few (deLeon, 1981, p. 214). But war game theory, as
distinct from that of analyses, is "...primarily a coherent
body of wisdom, characterized by judgment rather than
analysis - in the narrowest sense of that term." (Brewer and
Shubik, 1979, p. 72) The contribution of analysis, and
analytic theory, to gaming is unequivocal, but it is just as
important, and perhaps more illuminating, to subject the war
game to historical study and historical theorizing. The
historical paradigm is built on human judgment, as is the war
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game, so the wise strategist will rely on history, as well as
analysis, for developing his theories of war gaming.
Problems of war game application are best addressed with
a skeptical, questioning attitude. The strategist should
never be satisfied with claims of a game's validity. If play




there is a good chance that something has been
missed; too much has been simplified or assumed away. Just
as players should learn something from a game, so should
controllers, and designers. If such is not the case, a
breakdown of the "Gaming Loop" has occurred, and the smart
strategist should regard the game with suspicion, while
attempting to resurrect the games development process.
This thesis has already touched upon problems of applied
gaming currently receiving attention from strategists: the
importance of Control, improvements in Red play, the need for
better scenarios, etc. But nowhere today is
political -mi litary gaming at more significant watershed than
in the use of automation.
Automated models are becoming more practical, flexible,
and transparent, and more widely used in war games. Although
they are not a cure-all, careful application of
state-of-the-art computer technologies does hold promise for
many types of strategic games. Computerized games, if
conducted properly, enable the strategist to examine more
issues in less time and with more (but not too much)
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precision than completely manual methods. Fast, sophisticated
systems like the RSAS are capable of performing as players
and/or as Control in large-scale, aggregated game situations
that might normally take man-years of effort to conduct with
strictly human play. An especially fertile application may
emerge when such automated systems are wedded to other types
of games. For example, the RSAS would likely perform well as
a scenario generator or an adjudication device for a global
war game
.
With the surge of potentially useful information
emanating from both computerized and manual war games,
methods to extract game knowledge must be formulated. In
effect, the strategic community must construct an
epistemology of gaming.
"No one" concluded Brewer and Shubik in 1979, "is certain
about what game players, builders, and users, are actually
getting out of play, construction or use of these devices."
(Brewer and Shubik, 1979, p. 73) This statement apparently
still holds true eight years later, in light of the relative
dearth of studies that deal with information from war games.*
Several notable studies using war game information do
exist. These include: Brown, T.A. and Paxson, E.W.
A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation
Games, Rand Corporation Report P-1619-PR, September 1975.;
Mandel , Robert, "Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making
During Crises," World Politics , v. 29 pp. 610-625, July
1977.; and Vlahos , Michael, The Blue Sword: The Naval War
College and the American Mission. 1919-1941 . Naval War
College Press, 1980.
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It seem that much work remains to be done to build a body of
knowledge derived from gaming.
To encourage proper examination and interpretation of war
game knowledge, every game should incorporate complete
documentation and a formal analysis plan. Larger games and
game facilities may benefit even further by instituting a
research organization like the Analysis Group found at the
Naval War College's Global War Game, devoted entirely to the
study of war game information. Participants can assist in
the work of these groups by keeping "battle diaries": notes
made during actual game play of their observations, thoughts,
reasoning, and decisions (Perla, 1986, p. 30). And personnel
charged with documenting game results would do well to adopt
a report format that would facilitate later research.
»
Because of the war game's correspondence to the
historical paradigm, a war game report "should more closely
resemble an historical treatise than the the documentation of
a campaign analysis." (Perla, 1985a, p. 20) Like good
analytical history, it will examine causal factors and
motivations as well as simple event sequences. As a minimum,
game documentation should include:
» New opportunities for in-depth research of war games
are offered by automated systems like the RSAS . These systems
are capable of keeping detailed records of game decisions
and decision rationale to supplement the documented
impressions of human players and observers.
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- a statement of game objectives, and an outline of how the
game's design satisfies those objectives;
- a description of the game scenario, making underlying
assumptions as explicit as possible;
- a brief description of the game's models, emphasizing
their use and possible impacts on play, and explaining
their basic assumptions;
- a general chronology of game events;
- discussion and historical -type analysis of causation and
motivation behind game events;
- investigation of seemingly unusual, chance, or
contingency events , and how they affected game play;
- lessons learned; not "proofs" of theories and hypotheses,
but rather issues, broader insights, and generalizations
raised or suggested by the study of game events and
decisions; and
- topics and possible hypothesis to be researched further
or «xoimined in future games.
With the availability of comprehensive, we 1 1 -documented
information from war games, a number of new possibilities
emerge for strategic studies:
(1) In-depth examination of a given series of games,
specifically to identify and assess salient patterns
and ideas
.
(2) Research to compare and contrast past games to
actual historical events. The underlying reasons
for divergences and similarities between real and
fictitious events may provide greater insight into
the actual behavior of international actors.
(3) Comparative studies of different types of war games
dealing with similar issues. For example, the
strategist may want to compare the results of an
RSAS game with those of a seminar game. Besides
surfacing important new issues, such studies enhance
the validity of both kinds of games.
These are just a few of the sorts of studies made possible by
gaming (if documentation is properly prepared), and the
imaginative strategist will undoubtedly conceive of
additional research designs.
Gaming methodology is a unique and important tool for the
strategist/historian. Because of "..its ability to help us
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understand better the roles, capabilities, and limitations of
that most ubiquitous warfighting system, the human being,"
the war game "is a powerful and effective learning device."
(Perla, 1985a, p. 18) Games are used within the defense
community to educate and advocate, to plan and to organize
thinking, and to help develop new ideas and insights. They
offer a means to train present and future planners,
negotiators, and policymakers to grasp the dynamics of
international relations and strategic thought. They also
facilitate examination of numerous topics of more immediate
strategic interest.
War games give the strategist largely unmatched ability
to safely explore a host of momentous questions: what are
the relationships between protracted conventional war and
nuclear war?" How can conventional operations impact the
strategic nuclear balance? What types of command, control,
and communications limitations might the NCA face in
operating strategic forces after a massive nuclear attack?
How can the superpowers safely transition to security
postures based on strategic defenses? What are the merits of
a maritime strategy versus a continental strategy in various
parts of the world? What sorts of competitive strategies
seem most promising for future development? How might
military, political, economic, and social forces be employed
to achieve national goals in crisis situations short of war?
What kinds of long-term strategies and policies seem
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appropriate for dealing with non- superpower nations and other
international actors? What are the political and military
implications of different arms control regimes? What are
potentially fruitful techniques to employ when negotiating
arms control? Collective security agreements? War
termination? How might domestic political imperatives be
addressed in defense policies? What preparations must be
made in peacetime for effective mobilization in the face of
crisis or conflict?
The list of issues is seemingly endless, and gaming is a
methodology well-suited to explore many of them.
It is imperative that the strategist become involved with
the new gaming techniques being introduced today, and he must
lead the way in development of a war game epistemology to
unlock the potential of these new techniques. By projecting
his history-based perspective into gaming methodology, the
strategist can augment the analyst by exerting a realistic,
balancing influence on defense decisionmaking. Gaming, like
all efforts to improve defense policy-making, is not a
panacea, but it may help responsible officials reduce
uncertainties and hopefully introduce better decisions into
an already complex process. In this way, national security
policy may move beyond bean counts and black boxes into the




ANALYSIS: A set of empirical approaches to policy study.
These include Cost Effectiveness Analysis, Cost Benefit
Analysis, Systems Analysis, Operations Research, Campaign
Analysis, and others ( Quade , 1975, pp. 1-30). A branch of
analysis often confused with gaming is "game theory", which
is actually a body of mathematical theory that examines human
decisionmaking in situations of conflict and cooperation.
ANALYST: A person who applies analytical methods in policy
studies. Analysts frequently rely on mathematical models to
approximate selected elements of an idealized conflict. Their
vocabulary includes terms like data bases, force ratios,
attrition rates, subroutines, and algoritims. (Davis, 1985,
p. 4 )
EXERCISE: A game that simulates political or military
conflict using actual forces.
GAME: A competitive or conflict situation in which




MODEL: The representation of an object or structure; an
explanation or description of events, situations, processes
or entities; the rules and procedures needed for control and
conduct of a war game (Hausrath, 1971, p. 315).
POLITICAL -MILITARY GAME: See STRATEGIC GAME.
SIMULATION: The dynamic representation of events, situa-
tions, processes or entities by other systems or models
designed to have relevant similarity to the original (Brewer
and Shubik, 1979
, p. 9 ).
STRATEGIC GAME: A war game that examines a full range of
political, military, economic, and social issues with regard
to a nation's overall security policy (Brewer and Shubik,
1979, p. 377). Also known as a POLITICAL-MILITARY GAME.
STRATEGIST: One who studies and develops strategy, usually
from a non-technical or historical perspective. Most
Strategists are concerned with both grand and operational
components of strategy (see STRATEGY), and think in terms of
maneuver, initiative, surpise, quality of leadership, force
cohesion, mobilization, and national strengths, weai'n3sses
and goals. (Davis, 1985, p. 4)
STEIATEGY: Strategy actually consists of two components:
Grand Strategy and Operational Strategy. Grand strategy
deals with broad issues of war and peace. It attempts to
82
exploit, direct and coordinate national and/or alliance
resources to achieve policy objectives formulated by the
national/alliance leadership. Operational strategy, on the
other hand, is more exclusively concerned with the efficient
and proper direction of military forces to achieve national
policy goals. (Liddell Hart, 1967, pp. 335-336)
WAR GAME: A game that simulates political or military^
conflict without operating real forces.
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